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RETHINKING THE RATIONALE(S) FOR
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Stephen A. Saltzburg*
I. HEARSAY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Federal Rule of Evidence 8021 sets forth the basic hearsay rule and is
similar in principle to the basic rule in most states. It reads as follows:
Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay.
 Hearsay is not admissible unless2 any of the following provides
otherwise3:
 a federal statute;
 these rules; or
 other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.4

A. Nonhearsay Hearsay
The thirty-seven principal provisions that permit out-of-court statements
to be admitted for their truth under the Federal Rules of Evidence are found
in Article VIII of the Rules. There are eight provisions in Rule 801(d),
twenty-three provisions in Rule 803, five provisions in Rule 804 and one
provision in Rule 807 that can be relied upon to admit hearsay evidence for
its truth value.
The provisions found in Rule 801(d)5 are defined as not hearsay despite
the fact that they meet the definition of hearsay set forth in Rule 801(c)6 and
thus are an oxymoron: nonhearsay hearsay. The reason for this placement
and odd definition is that the drafters of the Federal Rules believed that the

* Stephen A. Saltzburg is the Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor at The
George Washington University Law School. He served on the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence and is currently the liaison to the Committee from the ABA
Criminal Justice Section. With Professors Michael M. Martin and Daniel J. Capra, he
coauthors the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual.
1. Throughout the Article, when I use the word “Rule,” I am referring to a Federal Rule
of Evidence.
2. This is the basic rule that exists virtually everywhere.
3. Obviously, states will provide their own exceptions and not make reference to
federal statutes, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or the U.S. Supreme Court.
4. FED. R. EVID. 802.
5. Id. 801(d) (listing statements that are not hearsay).
6. Id. 801(c) (defining hearsay).
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justifications for these provisions differed from the justifications supporting
true hearsay “exceptions”—i.e., those found in Rules 803,7 804,8 and 807.9
The original Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (or
“the Advisory Committee”) Note explained as to Rule 801(d)(1) that when
a testifying witness’s out-of-court statement is admitted, there is an
opportunity to assess demeanor that is often absent when other hearsay is
admitted.10 As to Rule 801(d)(2), the Advisory Committee relied upon the
notion that in an adversary system, parties are responsible for their own
statements and those of their agents: “Admissions by a party-opponent are
excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility
in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of
the conditions of the hearsay rule. No guarantee of trustworthiness is
required in the case of an admission.”11 The language in the Note that “[n]o
guarantee of trustworthiness is required”12 for what were originally called
“admissions” and are now party opponent’s statements13 suggests that Rule
801(d)(2) is different from the true hearsay “exceptions” because those
require a guarantee of trustworthiness.
B. True Hearsay Exceptions
Indeed, the original Advisory Committee believed that the exceptions set
forth in Rule 803 were not only supported by guarantees of trustworthiness,
but that those guarantees were sufficiently great that it adopted no
preference as between live testimony by the declarant and admission of outor-court statements qualifying under the exceptions:
The present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in
person at the trial even though he may be available. The theory finds vast
support in the many exceptions to the hearsay rule developed by the
common law in which unavailability of the declarant is not a relevant
factor. The present rule is a synthesis of them, with revision where
modern developments and conditions are believed to make that course
appropriate.14

7. Id. 803 (listing exceptions to the rule against hearsay that apply regardless of the
declarant’s availability).
8. Id. 804 (listing hearsay exceptions when the declarant is unavailable).
9. Id. 807 (providing a residual exception).
10. The Advisory Committee Note observed that “[i]n respect to demeanor, as Judge
Learned Hand observed in Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925), when the
jury decides that the truth is not what the witness says now, but what he said before, they are
still deciding from what they see and hear in court.” 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M.
MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.04[1], at 801-303
(10th ed. 2011) [hereinafter EVIDENCE MANUAL].
11. Id. at 801-305 to -06 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 801-306.
13. For an argument that changing the term “admission” to “an opposing party’s
statement” was a bad idea, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Restyling Choices and a Mistake, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2012).
14. EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 803.04[1], at 803-263.
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The Advisory Committee had a less favorable view of the reliability of
statements falling within the Rule 804(b) exceptions and thus required a
showing of unavailability as defined in Rule 804(a), along with satisfaction
of Rule 804(b), to admit hearsay statements:
Rule 803 [] is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement
falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the
conclusion that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a
relevant factor in determining admissibility. The instant rule proceeds
upon a different theory: hearsay which admittedly is not equal in quality
to testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted if
the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a specified
standard. The rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in
person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is
preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.15

There is reason to doubt whether the Advisory Committee’s
identification of more reliable16 and less reliable hearsay makes sense.17
My hypothesis is that most lawyers and judges would say that a dying
declaration, which was one of the original hearsay exceptions at common
law,18 is at least as reliable as an excited utterance (especially because most
dying declarations also qualify as excited utterances).19 A similar
hypothesis is that many—perhaps most—lawyers and judges would find
that declarations against interest, as defined in Rule 804(b)(3), are as
reliable as most hearsay that is admissible under Rule 803.20 But, this
15. Id. § 804.04[1], at 804-106.
16. In discussing hearsay exceptions I shall use “reliable” and “reliability” as synonyms
for “trustworthy” and “trustworthiness.” It will be clear, however, that I doubt whether some
of the exceptions are as reliable or trustworthy as the drafters assume.
17. Rule 807, the residual hearsay exception, was originally two exceptions, Rule
803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5). EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 807.02[2], at 807-3.
Those two exceptions were abrogated in 1997 to create Rule 807. Id. Rule 807 creates an
exception for a statement that “is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803
or 804,” and one of the requirements is that “the statement has equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness” as the exceptions found in those Rules. FED. R. EVID. 807.
Rule 807 does not distinguish between Rules 803 and 804 in terms of trustworthiness, but it
can only be relied upon when a statement “is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”
Id. 807(a)(3). As a practical matter, this means that if a declarant is available to testify, the
live testimony will be preferred over the hearsay statement.
18. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
19. This is because the state of excitement required for an excited utterance usually
exists when one is facing impending death and makes a statement concerning the cause of
that death. The less common case—one in which the declarant makes a dying declaration
after the excited state passes—is illustrated by State v. Quintana, 644 P.2d 531 (N.M. 1982),
where a shooting victim gave a statement five days after being shot to an attorney hired by
the victim’s family to investigate civil liability for the shooting. The excited state
attributable to the shooting almost surely had passed by the time the statement was made.
20. The former testimony defined by Rule 804(b)(1) arguably is the most reliable of the
hearsay exceptions, given that the testimony was given under oath and subject to
examination by a party with both motive and opportunity to conduct the examination. There
are good reasons to prefer live testimony for a fact finder to assess, and thus the placement of
former testimony in Rule 804 is appropriate. There is also a Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause right to have the government produce an available declarant upon
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Article is not intended to argue for reclassification of exceptions between
Rules 803 and 804.
I argue instead that the original Advisory Committee was wrong in
seeking to explain all exceptions in reliability terms; that there are, and
should be, three rationales for the hearsay exceptions that are defined by
both Rules 803 and 804; and that they are of approximately equal weight.
In short, an exclusive reliance on reliability is a mistake.
The three rationales are reliability, necessity, and adequate foundation.
Once these rationales are understood, the argument in favor of exceptions
for present sense impressions and excited utterances, and other hearsay
exceptions, appears strong.
II. ATTACKING PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
AND EXCITED UTTERANCES
Judge Ann Claire Williams has argued that the hearsay exceptions for
present sense impressions21 and excited utterances22 are illogical:
The theory underlying the present sense impression exception “is that
substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood
of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee’s note. Along similar lines, the idea behind the excited
utterance exception is that “circumstances may produce a condition of
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and
produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.” Id. In other words, the
statement must have been a spontaneous reaction to the startling event and
not the result of reflective thought. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272
(7th ed. 2013).
But that is not to say the spontaneity exceptions in the Federal Rules of
Evidence necessarily rest on a sound foundation. We have said before
regarding the reasoning behind the present sense impression that “[a]s
with much of the folk psychology of evidence, it is difficult to take this
rationale entirely seriously, since people are entirely capable of
spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances.” See Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d
580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting studies showing that less than one second
is needed to fabricate a lie) (citing Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense
Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 916
(2001)). As for the excited utterance exception, “The entire basis for the
exception may . . . be questioned. While psychologists would probably
concede that excitement minimizes the reflective self-interest influencing
the declarant’s statements, they have questioned whether this might be
outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the
declarant’s observation and judgment.” 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 272 (7th ed. 2013).23

whom it intends to rely in a criminal case. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968).
But, the Rule’s placement is not based on an assessment of the reliability of former
testimony.
21. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
22. Id. 803(2).
23. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
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III. BUT RELIABILITY ALONE DOES NOT EXPLAIN
THE FEDERAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Judge Williams’s argument is persuasive if hearsay exceptions must be
grounded in demonstrated reliability. But, as I shall explain below, many of
the hearsay exceptions found in Rules 803 and 804 would struggle to pass a
reliability test and are more properly grounded in the three rationales I set
forth above.
I put aside Rules 803(1) and 803(2) for the moment and focus on the
remaining Rules. A quick look at Rules 803 and 804 will demonstrate that
reliability cannot explain them all or even most of them.
A. Rule 803
I shall consider the Rule 803 exceptions seriatim, briefly explain why
reliability does not support any number of them, and indicate what I believe
are the real reasons we have each exception.
803(3). Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. I
submit that there is no reason to believe that statements of a present
physical or mental condition, or statements of an intention to do something
in the future, are typically true. People complain about their conditions for
any number of reasons—e.g., to avoid work (malingering), to excuse an
absence, or just to get sympathy. The true reason we have this exception is
necessity. There are only two ways to judge someone’s emotional or
physical condition and his or her plans for the future. One is to assess how
they act, and the other is to assess what they say. Both are needed to assess
mental or emotional condition and to analyze future intentions.
803(4). Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. People
who want a physician to accurately diagnose a problem and to arrive at a
treatment plan that is likely to work have a good reason to be honest with
their doctors. But people who want to secure controlled substances have
reason to lie to get them. People who visit medical personnel to recruit
them as expert witnesses for litigation purposes have reason to exaggerate
their conditions. The undeniable fact is that people see doctors for many
reasons and have varying motives for describing their present and past
medical symptoms. There is no way to assess which statements are likely
to be reliable.
There are three reasons we have this exception. The most important is
necessity because in many cases doctors could not correctly diagnose and
treat patients and/or explain their diagnosis or treatment without relying on
input from their patients. The second reason is reliability. We believe that
much information provided by patients to doctors is reliable, and this belief
finds support in medical testing which often can verify what a patient
claims. The third reason is that there will be an adequate foundation for a
trier of fact to assess the reliability of a patient’s statement. The trier will
know whether a patient saw a doctor for diagnosis and treatment and
whether the patient followed through with treatment, or whether the patient
saw a doctor with litigation in mind. Very often, there will be medical
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records spanning large periods of time that can be compared to particular
medical records that might be disputed.
803(5). Recorded Recollection. There is no evidence that people who
write down things that they cannot adequately recall when called as
witnesses at trial have actually created accurate records. They must testify
that memory was fresh when they created the record, but courts have treated
the concept of “fresh” with considerable elasticity.24 Witnesses who write
things down might make as many mistakes as witnesses who come to court
to testify and have their mistakes exposed on cross-examination. But,
witnesses who write things down and claim memory loss frequently
immunize mistakes from exposure because a cross-examiner cannot crossexamine a writing. The principal rationale for this exception is that the
witness will have to provide sufficient foundation to satisfy the rule and
answer certain questions: Why did she make a record? Does she frequently
make similar records? Was there any particular relationship to a party that
affected the record? The foundation also includes the jury’s ability to
observe the witness as she responds to questions.
803(6). Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Business records
might seem at first blush to be the classic example of reliability. After all,
businesses that do not keep accurate records might have difficulty
remaining profitable. But, the business record exception covers records
prepared by the largest entities in the world as well as mom-and-pop small
businesses. The degree of accuracy in records might vary depending on the
ways a business relies on its records, how they are maintained, who
maintains them, and whether they are audited. Moreover, businesses have
reason to understate income or overstate expenses for tax purposes and to
exaggerate profits to assuage investor concerns. Even though a business
record will not be admitted if an opponent is able to demonstrate that the
record is untrustworthy, meeting that burden is difficult given that all of the
information about the record is in the hands of the business that created it.25
It is also important to recognize that Rule 803(6) is not confined to
businesses; it covers all regularly conducted activities. This means that
records qualify under the exception if created by clubs, citizen
organizations, and other entities that are not concerned with profit and loss
and that might not suffer much hardship if records are not always accurate
and complete.
The most important rationale for the exception is necessity. Even a small
storeowner might have difficulty remembering every transaction that
occurred, and larger businesses have no reliable “memory” other than

24. Compare United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 231 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding
statement given to detective fifteen months after event qualifies), with Cathey v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1582 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding list of products plaintiff
was allegedly exposed to cannot qualify when made five years after exposure).
25. The Rule covers records prepared by regularly conducted activities throughout the
world. An opponent can challenge the trustworthiness of all records, but the burden of
proving untrustworthiness increases when the evidence of how the activity is conducted is
located in a distant land and often in a foreign language.
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records. A second rationale is reliability, as there is merit to the notion that
most businesses need reliable records. The third rationale is that there often
is a sufficient foundation that enables triers of fact to distinguish between
more and less reliable records. Although the custodian is not required to
lay an elaborate foundation for a business record, the proponent of the
record has a strategic reason to do more than the minimum required by Rule
803(6) if a record is important and the proponent wants to impress upon a
jury the circumstances in which it was made, kept, and verified.
803(7). Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The
analysis of business-type records set forth above applies equally here.
803(8). Public Records. Does anyone believe that every report prepared
by a government worker with a legal duty to make the report is accurate?
What about every fact found during a government investigation? My
hypothesis is that many, perhaps most, lawyers and judges would be
skeptical that government workers are more accurate than private sector
workers whose observations are not admissible unless contained in a record
that qualifies under Rule 803(6). Rule 803(8) has neither a requirement of
routine nor any other criteria grounded in trustworthiness. The principal
rationale for the exception is that a sufficient foundation usually must be
laid to explain how the observation was made or how an investigation was
conducted. The foundation also affords an opponent the opportunity to
show a lack of trustworthiness.
The one part of the Rule that is premised on trustworthiness is
803(8)(A)(i), which covers the office’s activities. It is this subsection that
covers, among other records, the receipt of tax returns by the Internal
Revenue Service and the filing of immigration documents by immigration
officials. These records are likely to be created and kept with more care
than many other records that are created by varying individuals who might
have no expectation that the records would be relied upon as important in
litigation.
803(9). Public Records of Vital Statistics. There is no way to measure
the accuracy of every record of a birth, death, or marriage that is reported to
a public office in accordance with a legal duty. It is likely, however, that a
person with a duty to report will not falsify the event. Whether such a
person will be accurate on names and dates is more questionable. In any
event, the rationales for this exception are necessity (governments need to
track this information) and trustworthiness.
803(10). Absence of a Public Record. This exception is based on
trustworthiness and tends to relate mostly to Rule 803(8)(A)(i), discussed
above.
803(11). Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or
Family History. How do the regularly kept records of a religious
organization compare in terms of reliability to business records? I doubt
that anyone knows, as a religious organization can take many shapes and
sizes. The array of records of such things as birth, ancestry, marriage,
divorce, death, or similar facts of personal or family history might well
depend on oral communications to the organization by members who might
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be reporting second or third level hearsay information. The rationale for
this exception is necessity. Many of these family events will not be
recorded elsewhere.
803(12). Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A
statement of fact contained in a certificate made by a person who is
authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified
is likely to be accurate and is necessary to generate a formal record of a
marriage or similar ceremony.
803(13). Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family
history contained in a family record such as a Bible or an engraving on an
urn or burial marker might reflect wishful thinking about a family member
rather than fact. The rationales for this exception are more likely to be
necessity (only the family has certain information) and sufficient foundation
(as to how the record was made and how it relates to other family records)
as opposed to trustworthiness.
803(14). Records of Documents that Affect an Interest in Property. An
exception for recorded documents is necessary in any property rights
system that authorizes the recording of documents to protect property
interests.26 The record generally creates rights and has legal significance,
which means it might be admissible as nonhearsay even without an
exception.27
803(15). Statements in Documents that Affect an Interest in Property.
This exception is closely related to 803(14), but covers statements in
documents that are filed that relate to but do not establish property rights.
The rationale is trustworthiness, as statements relating to those that affect
property interests are likely to be true. But, the exception recognizes that it
is inapplicable if dealings with the property are inconsistent with the
statements or the purpose of the document.
803(16). Statements in Ancient Documents. At one time, drafters might
have believed that a statement in a document that is at least twenty years old
and whose authenticity is established might be necessary to prove matters
that a community had long forgotten. The drafters would have reasoned
that fraud was unlikely because people do not generally plan fraud twenty
years in advance and cannot generally know what they would need to
succeed in a scheme twenty years in the future. Today, the typical use of
email, texting, and other forms of communication that often are stored for
long periods of time at little cost to the persons storing them means that
twenty years from now, there are likely to be millions or billions of
documents that were created hurriedly and with little concern for accuracy
and completeness. This exception might be the single best example of an
exception fraught with danger of unreliability. It is no wonder that the
26. See generally EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 803.02 [15], at 803-76.
27. The law is well established that “a statement such as a law or regulation or an order
is neither true nor false,” and “statements that do not assert, even implicitly, that things are
true will not be hearsay.” Id. § 801.02[1][e], at 801-20. If state law makes a filed document
“the law” as to property rights, arguably the document is neither true nor false and not
hearsay.

2016] RETHINKING RATIONALE(S): HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS

1493

current Advisory Committee is recommending that this exception be
abrogated.28
803(17). Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. This is
surely one of the best examples of an exception based on reliability. Stock
quotations and similar data that are sold by commercial vendors or included
in newspapers are generally accurate, and if a mistake is made it usually can
be easily identified by comparing it to sources that offer similar data.
Moreover, the fact that it is limited to compilations that are generally relied
on by the public or by persons in particular occupations is some guarantee
that sloppy or error-prone publications will not likely remain in business
long.
803(18). Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. At
first blush, this exception looks as reliable as the compilations covered by
803(17), but a second look reveals that this is not so. The fact that a
statement is found in a publication that is regarded as a reliable authority
does not mean that the statement is correct. This is easy to see when two
reliable treatises offer statements that contradict each other. One or the
other might be correct, or they both might be wrong. Reliability is a factor,
but so is necessity, and it is an important factor. Every scientific or other
expert relies on the work of others in becoming educated, staying informed,
and developing opinions. They must rely on the best information available,
even when that information might be debatable.
803(19). Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. How
accurate are reputations generally? Reputation and rumor are difficult to
separate. The broader the category of reputation evidence, the more likely
it is to include rumor. This exception is extremely broad covering family
and community and every matter of personal or family history. The
rationale surely is not trustworthiness. It is more likely necessity, as the
exception most likely will be employed when events occurred long ago
and/or outside the community in which a person resided many years later
and among groups that traditionally keep no formal records.
803(20). Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. The
same analysis as in 803(19) applies here.
803(21). Reputation Concerning Character. This reputation evidence is
different from 803(19) and (20) as it typically involves more recent
reputation. People’s characters are difficult to determine, however, and it is
doubtful that reputations are very accurate. Nevertheless, Rule 404(a) gives
a criminal defendant the right to initiate an inquiry into relevant character
traits. Thus, there must be a hearsay exception that permits the defendant to
do what Rule 404(a) permits. The principal rationale is sufficient
foundation, because the reputation witness must show familiarity with
others who know the defendant in order to demonstrate that there is a
reputation. And an opinion witness must show a sufficient foundation for

28. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 17, 2015,
at 13, 55–70.
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the opinion. A secondary rationale is necessity; there is a need for an
exception that corresponds to Rules 405(a) and 608(a).29
803(22). Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Judgments following pleas
of guilty or guilty verdicts in felony cases are admissible against the
defendant who was convicted. Although juries and judges make mistakes
and innocent people do plead guilty, the exception rests on the notion that
judgments in felony cases are generally reliable.
803(23). Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History, or
a Boundary. These judgments are generally much less reliable as a group
than those falling within 803(22). Judgments in civil cases might result
from defaults, litigants being unrepresented or not caring very much about
the outcome of minor disputes, or sweetheart suits intended to establish
something that is really not contested. Moreover, the preponderance of the
evidence standard used in civil cases means that a judgment might have
reflected a very close call by a judge or jury. Nonetheless, the rationale for
the exception is reliability, even though there is reason to question that
rationale.
B. Rule 804(b)
I turn now to the five exceptions found in Rule 804(b) and consider them
seriatim along with the rationales that support them.
804(1). Former Testimony. I have already made the point that former
testimony is probably one of the most reliable exceptions because it was
given under oath subject to examination by a party with an interest and
motive to test it.30 The principal rationale is surely reliability, but a
secondary and powerful rationale is the substantial foundation that is laid
for such testimony. The trier of fact often will learn the nature of the prior
dispute, which party tested the former testimony, and what the motive was
to do so in that dispute. This assists the trier in assessing the testimony’s
reliability.
804(2). Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. The dying
declaration rests upon two rationales, one of which is most often repeated.
The oft-repeated rationale is that a declarant will not want to meet his
“Maker” with a lie on his lips.31 This is a reliability rationale. Whether it
is in fact an accurate prediction of how dying people behave, we will never
know because there is no way to test the proposition in the mine-run cases.
Maybe truly vindictive people want to leave earth by wreaking last-minute
vengeance on those they hate. Maybe people dying hallucinate. Maybe the
29. Both at common law and under Rules 405(a) and 608(a), reputation evidence is a
permissible way to prove character evidence when character evidence is admissible either as
substantive, impeachment, or rehabilitative evidence. A hearsay exception is needed
because otherwise reputation evidence would fall within the definition of hearsay in Rule
801(c) and be inadmissible under Rule 802.
30. See supra note 20.
31. Reg. v. Osman, (1881) 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1 (N. Wales Cir.) at 3 (“[N]o person, who
is immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie on his lips.”), cited
with approval in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
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concerns about the negative impact of stress raised with respect to excited
utterances are also applicable here. In any event, the second rationale for
the exception is that the trier of fact receives substantial foundation
evidence about the condition of the declarant and the relationship of her
condition to the statement that is made. The tier of fact is then in a position
to decide how reliable or unreliable it believes the statement to be.
804(3). Statement Against Interest. There is no doubt that declarations
against interest rest principally upon a reliability rationale: namely that
individuals generally do not make statements that would hurt them
financially (including with respect to their property) or that would subject
themselves to criminal prosecution and conviction, unless the statements
are true. The exception has a corroboration requirement for statements
offered in criminal cases because trustworthiness may not be as readily
assumed in those cases, especially when a declarant has a motive to take
blame for the acts of another when blame might not actually result in actual
harm to the declarant.32
Is it clear that declarations against interest are generally reliable? There
is little empirical research to answer the question. We know that some
people accept responsibility for bad outcomes even though they are not at
fault. It is likely that some people believe they are at fault when they are
not. And it is surely possible that even in a civil case, a declarant will
deliberately take blame to spare another person from being held
responsible. Nevertheless, reliability is arguably sufficient to support the
exception, but it is not the sole rationale. Parties relying on declarations
against interest must demonstrate a sufficient foundation for such
statements, and that foundation enables a trier of fact to make a
determination as to their reliability.
804(4). Statement of Personal or Family History. This is one of the
broadest hearsay exceptions imaginable and the only true exception that
does not require a declarant to have personal knowledge. The absence of
personal knowledge is a strong signal that reliability cannot be at the core of
this exception. The rationale for it clearly is necessity.33 Many people have
not seen their parents’ birth certificates; yet, they believe they know their
birthdays. Even without seeing their parents’ birth certificates, most people
think they know who their grandparents are. How is that possible? It is
because their parents told them who they are and because they might well
have lived a long time interacting with the people they identified as
grandparents.34

32. See, e.g., United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1346–47 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding statement by declarant serving three life sentences that he murdered a prison guard
not sufficiently disserving).
33. It is a tragedy that Chief Justice John Marshall did not recognize this in deciding
Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290 (1813), where his opinion rejected a hearsay exception for
family history and relegated individuals to slavery who could have been free if the dissenting
opinion by Justice Duvall had prevailed. Id. at 299 (Duvall, J., dissenting).
34. There is certainly an opportunity for strategic behavior under this Rule. When a
billionaire dies, anyone can come forward to claim a legacy and allege that his mother told
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804(6). Statement Offered Against a Party That Wrongfully Caused the
Declarant’s Unavailability.35 This exception bears a close relationship to
Rule 801(d)(2), which is based on the adversarial process and the notion of
personal responsibility. Simply put, a party is not permitted to object to the
introduction of hearsay by wrongfully causing a declarant to be unavailable.
The wrongful conduct deprives an adversary of a witness, and the Rule
permits hearsay to substitute for the expected testimony of the witness.36
IV. RETURNING TO PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
AND EXCITED UTTERANCES
Rules 803(1) and 803(2) as I would break them up (denoted by bracketed
letters) read as follows:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement [a] describing or [b]
explaining an event or condition, made [c] while or [d]
immediately after the declarant perceived it.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement [a] relating to a [b] startling
event or condition, made [c] while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement [d] that it caused.
Both exceptions have four elements that must be established before
hearsay is admitted. Most courts have added a fifth, a corroboration
requirement, for present sense impressions.37 The stated rationales for the
exceptions are suspect, as Judge Williams has pointed out. The original
Advisory Committee explained the two exceptions as follows:
The underlying theory of Exception (1) [present sense impression] is that
substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. . . .
The theory of Exception (2) [excited utterance] is simply that
circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily
stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious
fabrication.38

The rationale is basically reliability. It is not hard to make the case with
respect to present sense impressions that people can lie about the event or
condition that they are perceiving, although the corroboration requirement
makes this a little more difficult than it otherwise might be. It is no harder
him that he is the illegitimate son of the billionaire. Fortunately, DNA tests make resolution
of the claim much easier than once might have been the case.
35. As noted supra note 17, Rule 804(b)(5) was abrogated in 1999, and its substance
was moved, along with that of Rule 803(24), to Rule 807.
36. Closely related to this Rule is the last sentence of Rule 804(a), which states that “this
subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement’s proponent procured or wrongfully caused
the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from attending or
testifying.” FED. R. EVID. 804(a). A party is not entitled to offer hearsay on the basis of the
unavailability of the declarant if the party wrongfully caused the unavailability. In short,
Rule 804 makes a party who wrongfully causes a declarant to be unavailable worse off in
two ways: the party cannot offer the declarant’s hearsay statements and cannot object to an
adversary’s offering the statements.
37. See EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 803.02[2][b], at 803-17 to -19.
38. Id. § 803.04[1], at 803-264.
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to challenge excited utterances by arguing that excitement can produce
stress that reduces reliability and that not all excitement stifles the ability to
fabricate.
But I believe that to establish that the exceptions apply, the substantial
foundation required under both Rules is sufficient to enable a trier of fact to
make a judgment as to the trustworthiness of statements that qualify and to
give those statements appropriate weight.39 That is why I have broken
down each exception to identify the required elements.
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that the substantial foundation rationale is a key
aspect of not only these two exceptions, but of the others that I analyze
above. It is high time that we gave up the ghost of the idea that our hearsay
exceptions are based exclusively on the reliability of statements falling
within the exceptions and recognized that there are three bases of true
hearsay exceptions: reliability, necessity, and substantial foundation.

39. Indeed, it is clearly true that some excited utterances are more reliable than trial
testimony. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Excited Utterances and Family Violence, 15 CRIM. JUST.
39 (2001).

